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COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF AN AIDS VICTIM
IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
The first cases of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS) were reported in 1981.1 Since that time more than
16,000 reported cases have resulted in at least 8,000 deaths.2
Each year the number of cases reported doubles.3 These sta-
tistics have led to AIDS becoming the number one health pri-
ority in this country.4
Due to its newness, its deadliness and its rapid spread,
AIDS poses a variety of legal issues that leaves the courts
struggling to keep pace with the development of this disease.
The fact that the two primary risk groups for this disease are
presently homosexuals and intravenous drug users compli-
cates these issues even further.5 The large number of people
already exposed to the virus 6 and the belief by many experts
1. Although, in retrospect, patients with AIDS symptoms were seen earlier, the
first AIDS cases were reported to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the spring of
1981. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update - United States, 32
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 310 (1983).
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1986, at CI, col. 2.
3. Id., Dec. 22, 1985, at 29, col. 4.
4. Message from Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret M. Heckler,
FDA DRUG BULLETIN (Nov. 1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW (1986) [herein-
after Message]. AIDS and the Law is an American Institute-American Bar Association
materials book collecting numerous articles on AIDS. It is cited throughout this article
accompanying the original source when possible.
5. HTL V-III Antibody Positive Individuals, A Clinician's Guide to Evaluation, 85
EPIDEMIOLOGY BULL. 3 (1985) [hereinafter Clinician's Guide], reprinted in AIDS AND
THE LAW 35 (1986).
6. Provisional Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening
Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1 (1985) [herein-
after Screening for Antibody], reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 110 (1986). Experts
approximate that anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 people have already been exposed to
the AIDS virus. The number of people exposed to the virus is determined by a blood
test. This test reveals the presence of antibodies that the body formed when it was
exposed to the HTLV-III virus. For further discussion of blood tests, see infra note 20
and accompanying text.
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that this disease will rapidly spread to heterosexuals means
that these legal issues do not only affect those in the high risk
groups.7 They affect us all. It will be the general population
that will have to work beside AIDS victims,8 go to school with
these afflicted individuals,9 pay the costs for their medical
care l° and generally co-exist in the same society."1
This Comment is an attempt to identify certain legal issues
that are raised in Wisconsin by this new disease. It attempts
to bring forward the manner in which other jurisdictions have
recently handled these issues or analogous ones, and how they
will probably be dealt with under Wisconsin law. This Com-
ment will cover specifically whether a victim has the right to
recover from someone who knowingly infects them with the
virus (primarily through sexual contact, but the basic tort the-
ories are applicable in a variety of factual settings),12 an AIDS
victim's rights to employment 13 and under what circum-
stances someone who might have AIDS should be able to pro-
cure insurance.14
7. Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III/
Lymphadenopathy - Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.
561 (1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 93 (1986). This report looks to the pres-
ence of AIDS among prostitutes and heterosexual Africans and Haitians to suggest the
spreading of AIDS in this country by heterosexual intercourse. See also Heterosexual
Transmission of HTLV-III, 85 EPIDEMIOLOGY BULL. 11 (1985), reprinted in AIDS
AND THE LAW 27 (1986).
8. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
9. Although this topic is not within the scope of this Comment, it is a serious issue
which just recently is drawing attention. For a discussion of the medical issues related
to AIDS in the classroom, see Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Il/Lymphadenopathy - Associated Virus, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 517 (1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE
LAW 108 (1986). For a discussion of the legal issues related to AIDS in the classroom,
see Schwarz & Schaffer, AIDS in the Classroom, - HOFSTRA L. REv. - (198-),
reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 421 (1986) (a revised draft of the unpublished future
law review article appears).
10. See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
11. This coexistence is necessary because quarantining AIDS victims is not a viable
alternative. It would probably violate an AIDS victim's constitutional rights. See
Comment, Fear Itself." AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 479 (1984-85). It would also be impracticable due to the large number of asymp-
tomatic individuals who cannot be identified but are considered infectious. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 28-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 74-139 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 140-82 and accompanying text.
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II. THE DISEASE
A basic understanding of how the disease operates is nec-
essary to understand its effects on the legal rights of its
victims.
The term "AIDS" refers to the most severe manifestation
of a spectrum of clinical disease caused by a virus variously
known as human T-lymphotropic virus (HTLV-III),
lymphadenopathy-associated virus (LAV) or AIDS associated
retrovirus (ARV).15 This virus attacks and cripples the body's
immune system by killing T-helper lymphocytes, thereby leav-
ing the body vulnerable to opportunistic infections and malig-
nancies. These infections and malignancies eventually lead to
death, usually within one or two years.1 6 The spread of the
virus seems to occur only through the exchange of bodily
fluids, that is, blood, blood products, or semen, between indi-
viduals.1 7 There is no evidence suggesting that the virus can
be spread by casual person-to-person contact. 18
A great part of the danger of the disease arises due to a
lengthy asymptomatic period of infection during which an ap-
parently healthy individual may unknowingly spread the dis-
ease to other persons through the exchange of blood, blood
products or semen. 9 One way to identify these asymptomatic
individuals is by administering an AIDS antibody test.20 This
15. Clinician's Guide, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 35
(1986). Human T-lymphotropic virus (HTLV-III) is the causative virus named by re-
searchers at the National Institute of Health (NIH). Lympadenopathy-associated virus
(LAV) is the causative virus named by French researchers at the Pasteur Institute in
France. FDA DRUG BULLETIN, supra note 4, at 2, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW
20 (1986).
16. AIDS AND THE LAw 127 (1986). For the basis of this data, see generally J.
SLAFF & J. BRUBAKER, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: How YOU CAN PROTECT YOURSELF
AND YOUR FAMILY, WHY YOU MUST (1986).
17. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type IlI/Lymphadenopathy---Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682 (1985) [hereinafter AIDS in the Work-
place], reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 50 (1986).
18. Id.
19. Id. "HTLV-III/LAV-infected individuals include those with AIDS (4); those
diagnosed by their physician(s) as having other illnesses due to infection with HTLV-
III/LAV; and those who have virologic or serologic evidence of infection with HTLV-
III/LAV but who are not ill." Id. (emphasis added).
20. The screening test that is presently used by blood banks and plasma centers is
the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). This test has a high number of false
positives. A false positive result occurs when, due to another virus or some unknown
1986]
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III. RECOVERY IN TORT
Seventy-three percent of those with AIDS acquired the
disease through homosexual intercourse.28 Since the vast ma-
jority of AIDS victims had the disease transmitted to them by
sexual contact, the scope of this section will involve their
rights to recovery for damages from the partner who inflicted
them with the virus.
When the virus is transmitted, the effects can be fatal. 29 If
the transmitter is an asymptomatic carrier who does not know
that he has the disease, the harm may be unavoidable. How-
ever, if the transmitter has had an antibody test, or has ARC
or AIDS symptoms, their failure to act in a socially responsi-
ble manner results in a serious wrong.30 The common law
area of torts is designed to compensate individuals for such
wrongs and should apply in these instances. 1 Since no case
has yet reached the appellate level for the sexual transmission
of AIDS, cases involving analogous communicable diseases
will be used to suggest the most probable causes of action
under which recovery is possible.
Of all communicable diseases, herpes in particular pos-
sesses close similarities to AIDS.32 It is an incurable, sexually
transmitted disease caused by a virus which cannot be medi-
28. The Public Health Service Response to AIDS, AIDS INFORMATION BULL. 1
(1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 7 (1986).
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
31. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1971); see also 1 J.
DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 2.03 (1982). Although this Comment will not discuss
intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is possible that there could be recovery
under this cause of action. See McKissick v. Schroeder, 70 Wis. 2d 825, 235 N.W.2d
686 (1975); Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970); see also
Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) (recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress held to be valid cause of action for transmis-
sion of genital herpes); Prentice & Murray, Liability for Transmission of Herpes: Using
Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty in Sexual Relationships, 11 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 67, 79-80 (1984).
32. For a discussion of recovery for herpes transmission employing traditional tort
principles, see Prentice & Murray, supra note 31, at 67; Comment, You Wouldn't Give
Me Anything, Would You? Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 60
(1983) [hereinafter Comment, Tort Liability for Herpes]; Comment, Herpes: A Basis for
Tort Action in California, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 189 (1984) [hereinafter Comment,
Herpes In California].
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cally prevented.33 Individuals with the disease may be asymp-
tomatic carriers who might or might not know they possess
the affliction, yet display no outward symptoms. 34 Both dis-
eases also carry considerable social stigmas. Herpes, of
course, while incurable, is not fatal. Nor does it have the long
incubation stage that AIDS possesses.35
A. Negligence
Wisconsin is one of a few states that expressly recognizes a
cause of action for the transmission of a communicable dis-
ease.36 In the case of Kliegel v. Aitken,37 the plaintiff was a
servant employed in a house where the owner's daughter was
ill with typhoid fever. The plaintiff worked in the house and
the sick child's room for a week without being informed of the
girl's illness. When the plaintiff came down with a serious at-
tack of typhoid fever a few days later, she commenced an ac-
tion against the defendant/master. The suit was based on
false misrepresentation as well as upon negligent failure to in-
form the plaintiff of the true nature of the disease and its dan-
gerous character.
In affirming the trial court's decision in favor of the plain-
tiff, the court stated that "[t]he general principle is well estab-
lished that one who negligently - that is, through want of
ordinary care- exposes another to an infectious or contagious
disease, which such other thereby contracts, is liable in dam-
33. Herpes simplex II (HSV-2) is transmitted primarily by genital routes and gen-
erally affects the genital area. Herpes simplex I (HSV-1) is generally transmitted
through non-genital routes and primarily affects the mouth. Nahmias & Roizman, In-
fection with Herpes - Simplex Viruses I and 2 (pt. 1), 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667
(1973).
34. Baker, Herpes Virus, 26 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 165, 167
(1983).
35. "Information about the course of infection with HTLV-III is incomplete, but
the majority of infected adults will not acquire clinically apparent AIDS in the first few
years after infection." Screening for Antibody, supra note 6, at 1, reprinted in AIDS
AND THE LAW 110 (1986). Herpes symptoms will usually appear within three to four
weeks. Baker, supra note 34, at 167.
36. See Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (genital herpes);
Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (smallpox); Earle v.
Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (tuberculosis).
37. 94 Wis. 432, 69 N.W. 67 (1896).
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ages therefor, in the absence of contributory negligence or as-
sumption of the risk."3 8
Since AIDS qualifies as an infectious disease, there is no
reason why recovery for this disease should be any different
than recovery for typhoid fever. When an individual fails to
exercise ordinary care without intending to do any wrong and
the act or omission subjects another to an unreasonable risk of
injury, that individual is negligent.39 When someone infected
with AIDS has intercourse and fails to tell his or her partner,
the risk to which the partner is exposed is unreasonable at the
very least. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the neg-
ligence involved in exposing someone to typhoid fever, and it
should continue to recognize this negligence when dealing
with AIDS.
Negligent conduct may also arise from carelessly exposing
oneself to the disease, knowing that one is in a high risk group
and failing to take an antibody test,40 ignoring symptoms of
the disease, or testing seropositive and continuing to have sex-
ual relations anyway.41 Due to the lack of knowledge as to its
infectiousness, having sexual relations with another when one
knows or should know that he or she is infected should be
considered an unreasonable risk. A duty to inform the part-
ner of a positive test result should be the minimum required of
a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence.
B. Misrepresentation
In Wisconsin, the cause of action based on misrepresenta-
tion is cloudier. The Kliegel court only addressed the jury in-
structions regarding the scope of the agency of the individual
who told the plaintiff that the defendant's daughter was only
suffering from "nervous prostration. ' ' 42 Since the court ap-
38. Id. at 435, 69 N.W. at 68. Kliegel has never been cited in a 'Wisconsin case for
this proposition.
39. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242-43, 234 N.W. 372, 379-80 (1931);
see also W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 105, at 685-86.
40. The groups of people categorized as being at a high risk to acquire AIDS are
homosexual or bisexual men, intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs, and children born
to mothers with AIDS. Haitians in this country are no longer considered a high risk
group. AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
41. At least one individual who was informed that he had AIDS continued his
sexual practices despite this knowledge. L.A. Daily J., Nov. 15, 1985, at 6, col. I.
42. Kliegel, 94 Wis. at 437, 69 N.W. at 69.
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proved of the jury instructions regarding this agency, it can be
inferred that the court recognized the jury instructions dealing
with misrepresentation as stating a valid cause of action.
Wisconsin case law dealing with misrepresentation sup-
ports this contention. Wisconsin's elements for intentional de-
ceit or misrepresentation are:
1. The defendant made a false representation of fact;
2. The representation of fact was untrue;
3. The defendant knew the representation was untrue or
made it recklessly without caring whether it was true
or false;
4. The defendant made the representation intending to
deceive and induce the plaintiff to act to the plaintiff's
pecuniary damage;
5. The plaintiff believed the representation to be true and
relied on it to his or her own injury or damage.43
The representation of fact does not necessarily have to be a
verbal statement. Silence on the part of the infected party
may be sufficient where there is a duty to speak. 4
In Scandrett v. Greenhouse,45 the court applied the rule
that silence can be a misrepresentation in an attorney-client
relationship. In Scandrett the court stated that:
A man may not only deceive another to his hurt by delib-
erately asserting a falsehood, as, for instance, by stating that
A is an honest man when he knows him to be a rogue, or
that a horse is sound and kind when he knows him to be
unsound and vicious, but also by any act or demeanor which
would naturally impress the mind of a careful man with a
mistaken belief, and form the basis of some change ofposition
by him.
4 6
43. See Wis. JI - Civil 2401 (1969); see also Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d
175, 368 N.W.2d 676 (1985); Goerke v. vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 226 N.W.2d 211
(1975); Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., 44 Wis. 2d 239, 170 N.W.2d 807 (1969);
Hoar v. Rasmusen, 229 Wis. 509, 282 N.W. 652 (1938); W. PROSSER, supra note 31,
§ 105, at 685-86.
44. Killeen v. Parent, 23 Wis. 2d 244, 251, 127 N.W.2d 38, 42 (1964); see also
Lundin, 124 Wis. 2d at 185 n.5, 368 N.W.2d at 681 n.5; Goerke, 67 Wis. 2d at 106-07,
226 N.W.2d at 214; Scandrett v. Greenhouse, 244 Wis. 108, 113, 11 N.W. 2d 510, 512
(1943); Hoar, 229 Wis, at 513-14, 282 N.W. at 654.
45. 244 Wis. 108, 11 N.W.2d 510 (1943).
46. Id. at 113-14, 11 N.W.2d at 512 (quoting Swift v. Rounds, 19 R.I. 527, -, 35
A. 45, 45 (1896) (emphasis in citing source only).
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In a situation involving AIDS, the horse or rogue would
be an apparently healthy person. This person might be sero-
positive or have AIDS in the ARC stage. Rather than having
a sound healthy body, the person has one that is unsound and
infectious. The infected individual's desire to proceed to have
intercourse would naturally seem to lead a prospective partner
to believe that the situation does not pose a threat to his or her
life. Under the mistaken belief that there is no danger, the
prospective partner proceeds to rely to his or her detriment
and have intercourse.47
The necessary confidential relationship giving rise to a
duty to speak has not yet been applied in Wisconsin to indi-
viduals who are sexually intimate. It has been expressly rec-
ognized in California when dealing with tortious liability for
the transmission of herpes. In Kathleen K v. Robert B.,48 the
California Court of Appeals determined that an unmarried
woman's complaint seeking damages because of the transmis-
sion of genital herpes through sexual intercourse stated a
cause of action for misrepresentation.49 In determining that a
confidential relationship exists similar to the one in a marital
relationship, the court stated that "a certain amount of trust
and confidence exists in any intimate relationship, at least to
the extent that one sexual partner represents to the other that
he or she is free from venereal or other dangerous contagious
disease. 50 With the confidential relationship established,
there arises the duty to disclose. Silence by one partner is
therefore a misrepresentation.
Other jurisdictions would seem to agree with California's
recognition of a confidential relationship between sexual part-
ners. Since they have recognized a confidential relationship
existing between "old friends,"'" it appears that they too
47. Other jurisdictions have recognized this representation as a valid cause of ac-
tion for the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. See Kathleen K., 150 Cal.
App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (genital herpes); State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A.
63 (1917) (syphilis); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (venereal
disease).
48. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
49. Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
50. Id. at 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77 (emphasis added).
51. See Alice D. v. William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1982);
Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d
939, 945-46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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would recognize a duty to disclose when two individuals are
more than just friends.
Proving the third element of misrepresentation, that the
defendant knew the representation was false or made it with-
out caring about its veracity, raises some problems. Due to
the virus' long incubation period, the fact that someone tests
positive does not necessarily mean the person has or will de-
velop AIDS.52 It is probably the case that someone who
transmitted the virus will be asymptomatic and not know he
or she is infected. In this case the knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of the knowledge element probably will not be met.53
This might be the situation in a majority of the cases. 4
A similar problem arises when a victim starts to progress
to the ARC category. At this time he or she will start to de-
velop the opportunistic infections that characterize this
stage,55 but may not recognize these infections as indicative of
AIDS. These infections are, after all, not really AIDS, but
rather bacteria and fungus diseases that attack a body with a
suppressed immune system.
The reasonable care exercised in ascertaining the facts
should also take into consideration whether or not the individ-
ual is a member of a high risk group.56 It can be argued that
members of these groups should be especially knowledgeable
about the disease due to the attention it has received and their
vested concerns. If, under these circumstances, a person of
ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to have
52. See supra notes 19 and 35 and accompanying text. Current data has not yet
determined exactly what percentage of those exposed to the virus will develop AIDS or
ARC. It is estimated by some experts that 5% to 19% of those exposed to the virus will
develop fullblown AIDS within two to five years of infection. An additional 25% will
probably progress to the ARC stage. Screening for Antibody, supra note 6, at 1, re-
printed in AIDS AND THE LAW 110 (1986).
53. The burden of proving intent may be lessened if the plaintiff sought relief on a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. The plaintiff would then only have to
prove that the defendant was negligent in his or her representations. See Wis. JI -
Civil 2403 (1969).
54. Since up to 1.5 million people may have been infected and not show any symp-
toms, it is probable that many of these people do not know that they are infectious
carriers of the HTLV-III virus. AIDS AND THE LAW 123 (1986).
55. For a more detailed description of ARC symptoms, see Clinician's Guide to
Evaluation of HTL V-I1 Antibody Positive Individuals 1 (1985), reprinted in AIDS AND
THE LAW 113 (1986).
56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ascertained that he had AIDS, then the plaintiff should be
able to prove negligent misrepresentation and recover under
that theory.57 By the time fullblown AIDS sets in, the severe
symptoms should leave little doubt as to the cause of their
illness.
The fourth element of deceit, that the representation was
made to deceive and induce the plaintiff to his pecuniary dam-
age, should pose few problems in a suit for intentional misrep-
resentation. An AIDS victim would surely realize that no one
would consent to sexual contact with someone who is in-
fected.58 The deceit and inducement elements are, therefore,
evident.
The last element, belief in the representation and the reli-
ance thereof, would be a question of fact. It seems likely,
though, that consent to sexual relations would be strong evi-
dence of belief and reliance that one's partner was free of
AIDS.
There is a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision on the issue
of the transmission of communicable diseases. The opinion
finds support from the decisions of other jurisdictions as well
as from the underlying theories of tort. It seems that a cause
of action for negligence and misrepresentation would be rec-
ognized in certain circumstances for the sexual transmission
of AIDS.
C. Battery
Battery is also a viable theory under which an AIDS vic-
tim may seek compensation. A battery is committed when
force or violence is used without permission to intentionally
inflict physical harm on another.59 The issue is whether there
is consent to sexual contact given the fact that one party did
not know that the other party had AIDS.
In Bartell v. State,60 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recog-
nized that having sexual contact with another may constitute
a battery where there is a misrepresentation as to its charac-
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. Deceit vitiates consent. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 105, at 685-86.
59. Wis. JI - Civil 2005 (1977); see also McCluskey v. Steinhorst, 45 Wis. 2d 350,
173 N.W.2d 148 (1970); Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
60. 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900).
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ter.61 In Bartell, the defendant made a girl remove her clothes
while he supposedly administered a healing massage. The
court affirmed a jury verdict that the removal of her clothes
was unnecessary, fraudulent and done for Bartell's personal
gratification. Due to the girl's ignorance of Bartell's true pur-
pose, the act constituted an assault and battery.62
In the context of AIDS, the situation is similar. One party
is not aware of the full circumstances surrounding the act.
The girl in Bartell consented to a therapeutic massage. She
did not consent to sexual contact. A prospective partner con-
sents to sex but does not consent to sex with someone who has
an infectious disease. Only a limited consent is given and any-
thing beyond that limited consent constitutes battery.63
For a battery to exist it is necessary that the offensive con-
tact be intentional. If the action of the infected party is
merely negligent, there is no battery. 64 This could cause
problems when dealing with a seropositive individual or some-
one who is asymptomatic. It can be argued that they do not
believe they have the disease. Without the knowledge that
they are committing an offensive contact, all the elements of a
battery are not present and there can be no recovery.
D. Right to Privacy: A Defense
Besides the usual defenses against the above mentioned
torts, 65 the right to privacy is a defense peculiar to sexual tort
liability that extends to many of the issues surrounding
AIDS.66 The issue has been raised that the court's addressing
these lawsuits is an unwarranted intrusion into the intimate
61. Id. at 343, 82 N.W. at 143.
62. Id.
63. See Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276; Lankford, 29
Del. 594, 102 A. 63; Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206; De Vail v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d
245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 105, at 683.
64. McCluskey, 45 Wis. 2d at 357, 173 N.W.2d at 152; Vosburg, 80 Wis. at 527, 50
N.W. at 404.
65. For a discussion of these defenses, see Prentice & Murray, supra note 32, at 83-
101; Comment, Tort Liability for Herpes, supra note 31, at 78-81; Comment, Herpes in
California, supra note 32, at 192-96.
66. See Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in
Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301 (1985);
Comment, supra note 11.
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sexual relations of individuals.67 The United States Supreme
Court has demonstrated a strong proclivity to judicial re-
straint when dealing with matters related to marriage, family
and sex. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,68 the Court determined that a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to
single persons, but not to married persons, was unconstitu-
tional. The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. ' 69  The choice to be sexually intimate
with someone could arguably be categorized as a matter fun-
damentally affecting a person.
For the government to interfere with a fundamental right,
the government must demonstrate a "compelling state inter-
est. ' ' 70 This compelling state interest arises due to the state's
responsibility to protect the public health, welfare and safety.
These compelling state interests will supercede an individual's
fundamental right to privacy.71 In Barbara A. v. John G.,72
the defendant had misrepresented to the plaintiff whom he im-
pregnated that he was sterile. In determining that a right to
privacy did not protect the defendant from litigation, the Cali-
fornia court stated:
Although the right to privacy is a freedom to be carefully
guarded, it is evident that it does not insulate a person from
all judicial inquiry into his or her sexual relations. We do
not think it should insulate from liability one sexual partner
who by intentionally tortious conduct causes physical injury
to the other. Public policy does not demand such protection
for the right of privacy. 3
67. Stephen K. v. Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980) (the
court held a cross-complaint alleging misrepresentation of birth control use against the
mother in a paternity action did not state a cause of action).
68. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
69. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
71. See id. at 155-57.
72. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
73. Id. at 381, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of where
the right to privacy should be guarded, see South Florida Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmus-
sen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (positive AIDS test result disclosed,
subjecting individual to social censure, embarassment or discrimination).
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The broad language used by this court clearly indicates that
the sexual transmission of AIDS should also not be protected
by a right to privacy.
IV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In addition to worries about his or her health, an AIDS
victim might also have to worry about survival in the employ-
ment market. Employers might refuse to hire a prospective
employee or choose to fire a present employee if they learn of
the employee's condition.74 This discrimination is a very real
concern of AIDS victims and might be occurring already.75
Such discrimination would essentially deprive victims of the
opportunity to earn a decent living.
In Wisconsin the hopes of an AIDS victim to combat this
discrimination lies in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act
(FEA).76 The purpose of this Act is to prevent discrimination
based on sex, race, religion or handicaps.77 The Act calls for a
liberal and broad interpretation of its language.78
There are three points essential to establishing that a per-
son has been discriminated against in regard to employment
due to a handicap: (1) the complainant must be handi-
capped within the meaning of the Fair Employment Act
(FEA); (2) the complainant must establish that the em-
ployer's discrimination was on the basis of handicap; and (3)
it must appear that the employer cannot justify its alleged
74. Recently, Wisconsin passed a law which prohibits discriminating against an
employee based on an antibody test result. Wis. STAT. § 103.15 (1986). It is possible
that discrimination will take place anyway. Employers could evaluate individuals in a
manner similar to the one used by insurance companies.
75. See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Broward County, No. 85-6623-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3,
1986) (competent state employee released after supervisor discovered that he had
AIDS).
76. Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-.395 (1983-84). This is especially true in light of a
United States Department of Justice - Office of Legal Counsel brief that an AIDS-
infected worker would have no redress under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 16,
87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1978)) for employ-
ment discrimination when the employer uses a pretext of fear of contagion to fire the
employee. This would be true regardless of how irrational the fear of contagion would
be. The Milwaukee J., June 24, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
77. Wis. STAT. § 111.31(2) (1983-84).
78. Wis. STAT. § 111.31(3) (1983-84).
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discrimination under the exception set forth in
§ 111.32(5)(f), Stats. 79
According to this, to receive the benefits of the Act, having
AIDS must first be found to constitute a handicap within the
meaning of the statute. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
determined that "[a] handicap is a mental or physical disabil-
ity or impairment that a person has in addition to his or her
normal limitations that makes achievement not merely diffi-
cult, but unusually difficult, or that limits the capacity to
work." 80
A. AIDS and ARC as Handicaps
A victim in the ARC or fullblown AIDS stage will have at
least enlarged lymph glands, weight loss and a lower tolerance
to infection.8 1 These conditions would almost certainly impair
one's ability to work.
The Wisconsin courts would probably come to the conclu-
sion that these conditions are handicaps based on a state
agency's finding that AIDS is a handicap and the courts' hold-
ings in other decisions of what constitutes a handicap.
In Racine Education Association v. Racine Unified School
District,8 2 a Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations (Equal Rights Division) examiner made an
initial determination that AIDS and ARC are handicaps
under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act.8 3 The complain-
ant labor organization commenced the action after the Racine
Unified School District adopted a work policy which would
exclude district staff members who had AIDS or ARC from
79. Boynton Cab Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 96 Wis.
2d 396, 406, 291 N.W.2d 850, 855 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
80. American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 119 Wis. 2d 706,
714, 350 N.W.2d 120, 124 (1984) (emphasis in original).
81. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
82. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations -Equal Rights Div., No.
8650279 (April 30, 1986) (initial determination).
83. Id. at 3. The report fails to determine which of the three categories of a handi-
cap, under Wis. STAT. § 111.32(8) (1983-84), AIDS is classified. The statute defines a
handicapped individual as an individual who:
(a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusually diffi-
cult or limits the capacity to work;
(b) Has a record of such an impairment; or
(c) Is perceived as having such an impairment.
Wis. STAT. § 111.32(8) (1983-84).
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attending work.84 The complaint also alleged that the policy
had a disparate impact on sexually active homosexual and/or
bisexual men.85
The examiner initially determined that both AIDS and
ARC are legally protected handicaps under the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Law and that, as a general rule, the school
district sought to prohibit the attendance at work of the com-
plainant's members who acquired AIDS.8 6 The examiner also
found that the school district's policy had a disparate impact
on a group because of their sexual orientation.8 7
The fact that a Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations examiner concluded that AIDS and ARC
are handicaps does not mean that the issue is necessarily re-
solved. Circuit courts are not bound by the legal conclusions
of an administrative agency.88 The courts, though, will defer
to a certain extent to the legal construction and application of
a statute by the agency charged with enforcing the statute.89
If there is a rational basis in law for the agency's interpreta-
tion, the court should not impose its judgment for that of the
agency.90 As will be demonstrated by looking to the Wiscon-
sin court's interpretation of what constitutes a handicap, it is
clear that case law supports this proposition.91
In Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co. v. De-
partment of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,92 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court approved a Department conclusion
that the complainant's history of asthma constituted a handi-
84. Racine Educ. Ass'n, No. 8650279 at 1.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 3, 5; see supra note 83. The examiner further noted that the latest gov-
ernment report, United States Public Health Service Guidelines on AIDS in the Work
Place, published on November 14, 1985, found that AIDS is not spread by casual con-
tact in the work place. Racine Educ. Ass'n, No. 8650279 at 5.
87. Racine Educ. Ass'n, No. 8650279 at 5-6. This holding was based on a figure
that approximately 73% of those with AIDS are sexually active homosexual and bisex-
ual men with multiple partners.
88. Eaton Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 122 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 364
N.W.2d 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1985).
89. Larson v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 76 Wis. 2d 595,
603, 252 N.W.2d 33, 36-37 (1977).
90. KlusendorfChevrolet-Buick, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 110 Wis.
2d 328, 331-32, 328 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App. 1982).
91. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
92. 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
[Vol. 70:55
RIGHTS OF AN AIDS VICTIM IN WISCONSIN
cap.93 The supreme court has, therefore, already determined
that a "disease" is a handicap. Additionally, in Chrysler Out-
board Corp. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Re-
lations,94 a Wisconsin circuit court determined that an
individual who suffers from acute lymphocytic leukemia has a
handicap within the meaning of the Wisconsin FEA 5 This
disease is similar to AIDS in that it lowers the body's defenses
to infections. The employer's doctor determined that the pro-
spective employee ran an increased risk of infection from mi-
nor injuries and a resulting prolonged recuperation which
would cause much lost time. The court determined that such
a basis for not hiring the individual was a discriminatory prac-
tice when it stated:
If an employee's illness or defect makes it more difficult for
him to find work, then it certainly operates to make achieve-
ment unusually difficult. The petitioner's refusal to hire the
complainant in the instant case because of his illness is a
classic example of how such an illness operates as a
handicap.
96
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also pointed out its use
of federal decisions to interpret what constitutes discrimina-
tion.97 Federal decisions also indicate that under certain cir-
cumstances a person with an infectious condition would be
protected from employment discrimination.
In Arline v. School Board of Nassau County,98 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and determined that an elementary school teacher who
was discharged for suffering from recurrent tuberculosis had
her rights violated under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 99 After reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the
93. Id. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446. The court stated that "it is our opinion that
handicap as used in § 111.32 (5), Stats., must be defined as including such diseases as
asthma which make achievement unusually difficult." Id. (emphasis added).
94. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane Co. 1976).
95. Id. at 345.
96. Id.
97. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the similar structure and purpose of
Wisconsin's FEA to the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub.
L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967). Boynton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d 396 at 411, 291 N.W.2d at
855.
98. 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985).
99. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, ch. 16, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1978)).
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court noted that there was no indication in the statute or legis-
lative history that contagious or infectious diseases were ex-
cluded from coverage. Since tuberculosis impaired the
teacher's working ability, it was a handicap within the mean-
ing of the statute.10° It appears from the purpose of the stat-
ute, a liberal construction, Wisconsin and federal case law
regarding handicaps, and an agency finding, that ARC and
fullblown AIDS would be considered handicaps within the
meaning of the FEA.
B. Seropositive Individuals as Handicapped
A new problem arises when considering if seropositive in-
dividuals may be considered handicapped under the FEA.101
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that since seropositive
individuals are asymptomatic, they do not have an "injury,
deterioration or lessening that could impede a person's normal
functioning in some manner and preclude the full and normal
use of one's sensory, mental or physical faculties." 102 By defi-
nition, seropositive individuals are presently perfectly healthy.
They only possess an increased risk of developing AIDS or
ARC in the future. 103
The language used by the court appears to track only the
definition of "handicapped" found at Wis. Stat.
§ 111.32(8)(a). It does not mention Wis. Stat. § 111.32(8)(c)
which states that a handicapped individual is also one who
"[i]s perceived as having such an impairment." 1°4
In American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review
Commission, 105 the Wisconsin Supreme Court had to deter-
mine whether a four-foot, ten-inch woman who applied for
and was denied a job on an AMC assembly line was handi-
capped within the meaning of the statute. AMC readily ad-
100. Arline, 772 F.2d at 764. The court looked at the language of the statute and
its construction under 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2). Arline, 772 F.2d at 763.
101. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. The issue of seropositivity was
never decided in Racine Educ. Ass'n, No. 8650279. Whether it is considered a handicap
by the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations would depend
on which classification of handicap under Wis. STAT. § 111.32(8), AIDS is placed. See
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
102. American Motors, 119 Wis. 2d at 713, 350 N.W.2d at 123 (1984).
103. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
104. Wis. STAT. § 11 1.32(8)(c) (1983-84).
105. 119 Wis. 2d 706, 350 N.W.2d 120 (1984).
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mitted that the woman was not hired because the company
doctor believed that her small stature would adversely affect
her work performance. 10 6
At first glance, one would believe that AMC did not hire
her because the company perceived her to have "a physical or
mental impairment which makes achievement unusually diffi-
cult or limits the capacity to work."' 1 7 According to the court
though, this is not true. Her short stature is merely an inher-
ent limitation or deviation from the norm. 10 8 Since shortness
is not a handicap, a perception of shortness cannot be a per-
ception of a handicap. 109 Employers are, therefore, free to dis-
criminate based on this physical trait. Given the liberal,
rather than restrictive, interpretation of the statute that the
legislature established, this is a somewhat strained analysis.
Whether or not seropositiveness is perceived as a handicap
depends on which way the court believes an employer would
view the seropositive individual. If the court says that a sero-
positive individual is perceived as having AIDS (a real handi-
cap), then the individual is perceived as having a handicap. If
the court believes that the individual is perceived as merely
having a positive test to a virus, exposure to the virus is not a
handicap because it does not truly impair or disable a person.
Since it is not perceived as a handicap, employers can discrim-
inate against the present or prospective employee. Following
the rationale of American Motors, the latter is the course the
court should take based on its prior decisions.
If the court follows Justice Abrahamson's analysis, which
is a much more logical approach, seropositive individuals
would be considered handicapped." 0 Common sense tells us
106. Id. at 708-09, 350 N.W.2d at 121. The medical director had given the com-
plainant a ten minute physical. Part of this physical consisted of the complainant
touching her toes, lifting her arms above her head and stretching her arms to the side.
Based on this examination, the medical director recommended the complainant not be
hired because she was too small to perform the job.
107. Wis. STAT. § l1l.32(8)(a) (1983-84).
108. American Motors, 119 Wis. 2d at 713, 350 N.W.2d at 123-24. The court
stated that "[a]ll persons, given their individual characteristics and capabilities, have
inherent limitations on their general ability to achieve or to perform certain jobs ....
However, such inherent limitations or deviations from the norm do not automatically
constitute handicaps." Id. at 713, 350 N.W.2d at 123-24.
109. Id. at 716, 350 N.W.2d at 125.
110. Id. at 719-20, 350 N.W.2d at 126 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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that the employer would not be hiring the individual because
the employer believes the seropositive individual would be im-
paired in his or her job performance. This is exactly what the
statute is designed to prevent. A seropositive individual
would, therefore, be considered handicapped for the purposes
of the statute under this interpretation.
C. Proof that an Employer's Discrimination is on the Basis
of a Handicap
The third element in establishing a discrimination case
based on a handicap is that the employer cannot justify his
discrimination under the Act.111 Once the claimant has
demonstrated that he or she was refused employment because
of a handicap, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
justify the refusal. The employer must show that "[the com-
plainant] was physically unable to efficiently perform the du-
ties of [the position applied for] at the standard set by [the
employer]." 1 2 Contained within this burden of proof are two
analytically distinct points: (1) is the complainant able to per-
form the duties of the job; and (2) would hiring the complain-
ant be hazardous to the safety of the complainant, co-workers
or the public. 113
As to the first element, the courts have determined that
this language relates to the complainant's present ability to
perform the duties of the job.1 14 The courts have construed
this to mean that even though the prospective employee might
have some medical or physiological condition which may lead
to later disqualification, a mere speculation that the employee
may in the future be unable to fulfill certain job functions or
may present special expenses to the employer due to the possi-
bility of incurring work-related injuries is not sufficient to jus-
tify present discrimination. In the case of seropositive
individuals, this means they would not fall within the excep-
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. Boynton Cab., 96 Wis. 2d at 408, 291 N.W.2d at 856.
113. Id.; Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 90
Wis. 2d 408, 423, 280 N.W.2d 142, 149 (1979).
114. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 480 N.E.2d
695, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1985); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane
Co. 1976).
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tion. They presently have no disabilities that would inhibit
their job performance.
A more questionable result occurs when ARC victims are
considered. These individuals are borderline cases. They may
be suffering from one of the symptoms of the disease to a de-
gree where they cannot perform a job."1 5 If an ARC victim
recovers from a bout of illness, though, he or she may be able
to satisfactorily perform the job again for some time before the
symptoms of the disease again keeps the victim from perform-
ing his or her duties.
These individuals must be evaluated on an individual case-
by-case analysis.11 6 It appears that at times these individuals
will be healthy enough to work and, therefore, not fall within
the exception. However, in the near future they would again
fall within the exception due to a new illness.
Fullblown AIDS victims, with little doubt, would fall
within the exception. They would likely be bedridden, weak
and suffering from a serious infection.1 7 Even light clerical
work would seem out of the question for someone who is in
the advanced stages of terminal cancer or suffering from in-
sane delusions. 18
The next issue in determining whether those ARC victims
who are presently able to work and whether seropositive indi-
viduals are within the exception to discrimination is the safety
hazard they pose. 19 The two standards imposed by the stat-
ute are the reasonable probability and the rational relationship
tests.120 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has described the bur-
den of proof the employer must meet to satisfy the exception:
If the evidence shows that the applicant has a present
ability to physically accomplish the tasks which make up the
job duties, the employer must establish to a reasonable
115. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
116. Wis. STAT. § 111.34(2)(b) (1983-84).
117. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
118. Cancer and mental insanity often accompany the final stage in the AIDS spec-
trum. Clinician's Guide, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 37 (1986).
119. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. In light of federal warnings
dealing with those employed in the health care and food services industries, perhaps
these would also receive special treatment. See Wis. STAT. § 111.34(2) (1983-84); Aids
in the Workplace, supra note 17, at 683-84, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 51-52
(1986) (demonstrating a reasonable relationship is applied to all other jobs).
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probability that because of the complainant's physical condi-
tion, employment in the position sought would be hazardous
to the health or safety of the complainant or to other em-
ployees or frequenters of the place of employment.12 1
Due to a change in the statute, 122 the employer may now
also consider if the prospective employee not only poses a
present threat, but whether or not it is reasonably probable
that the employee will pose a safety threat in the future as
well. 123 No cases have yet interpreted this change in the
statute.
In light of a recent report put out by the Center for Dis-
ease Control, 124 it appears that the individual with ARC and
seropositive tests should pose no safety hazards in an ordinary
work environment. According to these latest findings, there is
no factual evidence to suggest that the AIDS virus can be
spread by casual contact. 125 This means that both the general
public and co-workers should have nothing to fear from some-
one who has been exposed to the AIDS virus.
A new problem arises due to the consideration of safety
hazards posed in the future. Although there appears to be no
reason to fear exposure to the virus itself from casual work
place contact, those with ARC not only suffer from the AIDS
virus, but also from the infectious diseases associated with the
depressed immune system. 126 Some of the secondary diseases
might be more contagious than actual AIDS, and pose an ad-
ded health threat.127 They are illnesses which can be spread
by casual contact and might pose a "reasonable probability"
of a safety hazard.
Further, since a substantial number of those who test posi-
tive for the AIDS virus will progress either to ARC or full-
121. Boynton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d at 409, 291 N.W.2d at 856 (quoting Bucyrus-Erie, 90
Wis. 2d at 424, 280 N.W.2d at 150).
122. WIS. STAT. § 227.20(1) (1973) was repealed by 1975 Wis. Laws 414, 523 (eff.
Sept. 1976). Wis. STAT. § 227.20(1)-.20(9) was created by 1975 Wis. Laws 414, 525.
123. WXIs. STAT. § 111.34(2)(b) (1983-84).
124. See generally AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 17, reprinted in AIDS AND
THE LAW (1986).
125. Id. at 682.
126. AIDS AND THE LAW 129 (1986).
127. Hepatitis B (HBV), a disease that afflicts many AIDS victims, has a higher
risk of being transmitted than does AIDS. AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 17, at
683, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 51 (1986).
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blown AIDS within two or three years, these individuals face
an increased risk of also developing the secondary contagious
illnesses. 128 Whether this increased risk is equivalent to a
"reasonable probability" of posing a safety hazard is difficult
to determine due to the newness of the disease. It does not
appear that medical studies have yet determined this. A pos-
sible solution would be to let these people work until evidence
proves otherwise or their condition progresses to a stage
where it is obviously ill-advised to allow them to work any
longer. The individual case-by-case analysis promulgated by
the statute should allow for the flexibility necessary to allow
this. Policy reasons would also argue against excluding these
individuals from the work force. If the number of ARC and
seropositive individuals is as high as predicted, the loss of
these individuals from the work force could have severe effects
on the economy.1 29
The other consideration in regards to safety is for the
safety of the afflicted individual's own health.1 30 In the work
environment, not only could the victim pass the AIDS virus
to others, but co-employees could pass their illnesses to him.
The AIDS victim's weakened immune system will enhance
this possibility.1 31 On this topic the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has stated: "We do not believe that the legislature when pro-
scribing discrimination against those physically handicapped
intended to force an employer into the position of aiding a
handicapped person to further injury, aggravating the inten-
sity of the handicap or creating a situation injurious to
others." 132 Again, the question is, is there a reasonable
probability of this occurring? The answer is also, once again,
that medical evidence is not yet available to make this
determination.
128. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
129. Allowing AIDS victims to work might be required if there are many victims
as some experts predict. The loss of workers would otherwise adversely affect the econ-
omy. AIDS AND THE LAW 125 (1986).
130. Wis. STAT. § 111.34(2)(b) (1983-84). See generally Samens v. Labor & In-
dus. Review Comm'n, 117 Wis. 2d 646, 664-68, 345 N.W.2d 432, 439-42 (1984); Boyn-
ton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d at 409-16, 291 N.W.2d at 856-60.
131. See supra note 16.
132. Bucyrus-Erie, 90 Wis. 2d at 423, 280 N.W.2d at 149-50.
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The rational relationship test provides a lighter burden of
proof placed on an employer who has a higher "special duty
of care" such as common carriers. 133 To meet this burden, the
employer must only prove that its policy of not hiring a handi-
capped person was "not the result of an arbitrary belief lack-
ing in objective reason or rationale.... [I]t is enough to show
that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life
of one more person than might otherwise occur under the
present hiring practice."' 134 It would seem that such an in-
creased risk to someone's health occurs when there is any con-
tact with an AIDS victim.
Although this standard has only been applied to a com-
mon carrier and an electric company groundman, perhaps it
would be placed on health care and food service positions
when dealing with an AIDS victim. 135 Health care workers
particularly will have close contact to many people who are in
a weakened state of health due to a prior illness. Food han-
dled by AIDS victims will be ingested directly into bodies of a
consumer. It can be argued that both industries owe a high
duty of care to third parties who rely on them for vital serv-
ices. The health of others is entrusted to them. If these two
industries were encompassed within the industries falling
under the rational relationship test, it appears discrimination
would be possible because of the slight increase in risk the
hiring of an AIDS victim would cause.1 36
The last discrimination issue in employment deals with the
right to all the benefits of the job including insurance cover-
age. Until 1982, an employer could exclude or restrict a
133. Wis. STAT. § 11 1.34(2)(c) (1983-84); see Samens, 117 Wis. 2d at 663-64, 345
N.W.2d at 439 (the court determined that an electric company groundman was in-
cluded in this exception); see also Boynton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d at 409-19, 291 N.W.2d at
856-61 (rational relationship test applied to cab driver).
134. Boynton Cab, 96 Wis. 2d at 415, 291 N.W.2d at 859 (quoting Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 863-65 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1122 (1975)).
135. AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 17, at 682-86, reprinted in AIDS AND THE
LAw 50-54 (1986). The report deals with the transmission of AIDS from patients to
health care workers describing the risks associated with that contact.
136. Id. If medical experts did not believe that there was at least a slight increased
risk, it seems there would be no need to promulgate special safety procedures for health
care workers and others who work closely with AIDS patients.
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handicapped employee from life or disability insurance. 137
This form of discrimination has been removed. The employer
now must contribute the same amounts to the fringe benefits
of a handicapped person as any other employee.1 38 This in-
cludes life and disability insurance. 139
V. INSURANCE
The rising incidence of AIDS raises the issue of the right
of an individual to procure insurance and under what condi-
tions. ,40 Since group insurers do not perform individual eval-
uations of future policyholders, an AIDS victim under a
group plan might have no difficulty procuring insurance. The
financial effect of insuring an AIDS victim will be spread
among the group.' 41 The employer will pay for the increased
costs of this occurrence by a related increase in his insurance
premiums. 142 Likewise, having AIDS will not affect someone
who already has insurance. It will be treated as any other ill-
ness for purposes of paying claims.' 43 The group that will be
affected to the greatest degree are insurance underwriters issu-
ing new policies. The concern of these underwriters and this
137. WIS. STAT. § 111.32(5)(f) (1973), repealed by 1981 Wis. Laws 334 (Aug. 4,
1982).
138. Wis. STAT. § 111.322(1) (1983-84).
139. These two forms of insurance will probably be the main concern of most
AIDS patients due to the high cost of medical care treatment. It currently costs ap-
proximately $100,000 to pay for the hospitalization of an AIDS patient. AIDS AND
THE LAW 125 (1986).
140. See generally White Paper, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome &
HTL V-11 Antibody Testing (Nov. 25, 1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 399
(1986) (citations following in this paper will be to AIDS and the Law) (submitted by the
American Council of Life Insurance) [hereinafter White Paper]; Report to the Life In-
surance (A) Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (Dec. 10, 1985), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW
411 (1986) (citations following in this paper will be to AIDSand the Law) (submitted by
the American Council of Life Insurance) [hereinafterCommittee Report]; M. HODGSON
& E. McDONOUGH, AIDS AND INSURANCE (1986), reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW
389 (1986) (citations following in this paper will be to AIDS and the Law) [hereinafter
M. HODGSON & E. MCDONOUGH].
141. White Paper, supra note 140, at 404; M. HODGSON & E. McDONOUGH, supra
note 140, at 394.
142. M. HODGSON & E. MCDONOUGH, supra note 140, at 393.
143. White Paper, supra note 140, at 404; M. HODGSON & E. MCDONOUGH, supra
note 140, at 393.
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section is the disparity in the risk posed to the premium
paid. 144
The ultimate concern, of course, is who is going to pay for
the cost of caring for AIDS victims. The ultimate answer to
this question, at least, may inevitably be the general popula-
tion regardless of how this issue is resolved.
This issue creates a conflict of interest between members of
high risk groups, insurance companies and the general public.
High risk group members fear exclusion from life and health
insurance. 145 If these AIDS patients do not have insurance or
personal resources to cover the medical costs, they may be
forced to turn to a public assistance program such as Medi-
caid. 146 The general public would probably like to see this dis-
couraged since they will bear the costs through tax dollars.
Insurance companies, of course, do not want to insure these
individuals who pose a high risk of large claims.
The issue of who will pay is unique in Wisconsin due to a
statute which presently prohibits insurance companies from
administering or inquiring about the results of an AIDS an-
tibody test. 147 This leaves the insurance companies only with
less accurate and more subjective ways to test the individual's
risk of acquiring AIDS. 148
144. White Paper, supra note 140, at 404; see also Committee Report, supra note
140, at 418.
145. Exclusion from coverage may be the only viable alternative that insurance
companies possess. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
146. M. HODGSON & E. MCDONOUGH, supra note 140, at 391.
147. Wis. STAT. § 631.90 (1986). This prohibition against using the HTLV-III test
might be removed by the end of 1986. See infra note 158.
148. White Paper, supra note 140, at 406.
[T]o accurately assess the level of risk, which an applicant presents, an un-
derwriter may ask the applicant additional questions directed specifically at the
AIDS risk, have the applicant physically examined and look for indications of
treatment for other sexually transmitted diseases. In addition, the underwriter
will be alert to unexplained signs and symptoms that may suggest impaired im-
munity and will want to be sure that the insurance applied for actually fits the
applicant's financial picture.
Id. at 406-07.
At least one Wisconsin insurer will be asking its high risk life insurance applicants to
undergo T-cell testing. The Milwaukee J., July 28, 1986, at 3D, col. 4. This method of
testing, while permissible in Wisconsin, is less reliable than HTLV-III testing and can
fail applicants who have T-cell abnormalities that are not caused by exposure to the
HTLV-III virus. Id. at col. 5.
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A. Nature of the Industry
When trying to resolve these conflicts, it is important to
keep in mind the nature of the insurance industry. "Insurers
are in the business of the acceptance of risks in return for
compensation paid by the insured in the form of the policy
premium."' 49 The resulting policy is a contract into which the
parties voluntarily enter. It may contain whatever provisions
to which the parties agree so long as the provisions are not
against public policy or prohibited by law. 150 To determine
the terms of this voluntary contract, the insured will make
representations to the insurer to enable the insurer to decide
whether he will accept the risks and at what premium. With
life insurance, these rates will be determined as accurately as
possible through actuarial tables.' 5' Although the insurance
industry receives special regulation under the law, basic con-
tract principles still apply. The parties are free to agree as to
what losses or classes of losses will be covered and which ex-
cluded. Likewise, the contract could be voided for an inten-
tional misrepresentation of a material fact. 152
B. Identifying High Risk Individuals
Due to the increased risk of death and immense medical
bills incurred by AIDS victims, insurance companies are natu-
rally attempting to identify high-risk individuals. 153  Using
traditional techniques of health questionnaires and physical
examinations, insurance companies are presently attempting
to screen prospective policyholders who might develop AIDS
or ARC.154 These are the individuals of greatest concern to
the industry. It is the great number of asymptomatic sero-
positive individuals that pose the greatest risk to the insurance
industry in the future. Seropositive individuals might not only
149. I G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:22, at 37 (rev. ed. 1984).
150. Id., § 1:5, at 10.
151. Due to the newness of this disease and the uncertainty regarding the effects of
exposure to the virus, data on which to base these actuarial tables might not yet be
available. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
152. WIs. STAT. § 631.11 (1983-84); see Eisenberg v. Continental Co., 48 Wis. 2d
637, 180 N.W.2d 726 (1970); Kelly v. Madison Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 2d 152, 154
N.W.2d 334 (1967).
153. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
154. White Paper, supra note 140, at 403-04.
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know that they are a member of a high risk group while the
insurance company does not, they might also have been tested
positive for exposure to the AIDS virus. 155 This could make
an almost fifty-fifty chance that they will develop AIDS or
ARC. 156 The risk a seropositive individual presents is, there-
fore, significantly higher than that presented by a normal
policyholder.
Naturally, insurance companies would like to avoid insur-
ing policyholders who pose such high risks. One of the most
effective ways to screen these individuals is by antibody expo-
sure testing.157  The criticisms of this policy are threefold.
First, the tests do not diagnose AIDS. They merely indicate
exposure to the virus. Perhaps eighty percent of those who
are exposed will never develop an AIDS symptom, yet will be
denied coverage.158 Second, since the tests were designed for
blood banks, the tests are over sensitive and produce a high
rate of false positives. 5 9 Third, to protect their insurability,
many individuals may be discouraged from being tested if
they are required to disclose the results.
160
The counterarguments to these objections are that even
though one who has been exposed to the AIDS virus may
never actually develop the disease, he still poses a great risk of
developing AIDS.16 1 It is this risk upon which his premium is
based. Merely because someone is an overweight, middle aged
male who smokes does not necessarily mean he will develop
heart disease. He does stand a much greater risk, though,
than someone who is twenty years younger and in good physi-
cal condition. Consequently, the middle aged male will pay a
155. "Past experience shows that many individuals who receive a positive HLTV-
III test result immediately seek insurance coverage." M. HODGSON & E. McDoN-
OUGH, supra note 140, at 396.
156. Taking the upper range of estimates for acquiring ARC or AIDS once an
individual tests positive, there is a 44% likelihood of reaching these two stages. See
supra notes 23 & 25 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 20 & 21 and accompanying text.
158. M. HODGSON & E. McDONOUGH, supra note 140, at 395. The authors cite B.
Schatz, C. Heimann & W. Warner, AIDS and Insurance: Legal and Policy Considera-
tions (article submitted to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners partly
on behalf of the National Gay Rights Advocates), reprinted in AIDS: LEGAL ASPECTS
OF A MEDICAL CRISIS 571 (Law Journal Seminar - Press 1986).
159. M. HODGSON & E. McDONOUGH, supra note 140, at 395.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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higher premium consistent with the higher risk he presents. 162
The same should be true for someone who has been exposed to
the AIDS virus.
Secondly, although there is presently a high rate of false
positives, the accuracy of these tests is improving.163 Further,
the insurance practice is to repeat the antibody test and if it is
again positive, to finally administer an even more accurate
test. 164 Only if all three are positive would the individual be
considered seropositive.
The last argument for utilizing these tests is that they pro-
vide the most accurate, objective means available for evaluat-
ing risks on an individual basis.1 65  If the test was not
administered, insurers would attempt to evaluate applicants
on more subjective, less accurate criteria. This greater inaccu-
racy might lead to greater unfairness. Applicants of average
risk might be rejected because of their appearance of being a
high risk group member. 166
C. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin legislative response to the issue of these
tests has been to disallow their use for purposes of extending
insurance coverage or determining insurance rates. 167 For the
underwriting of individual insurance policies this is condi-
tional. If the state epidemiologist and insurance commis-
sioner certify the reliability of a screening test in the future,
insurance companies will be able to implement them.'68
162. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 140, at 405 (analogy is made between insur-
ance industry's treatment of individuals with coronary heart disease (CHD) and AIDS).
163. Message, supra note 4.
164. White Paper, supra note 140, at 403. The more accurate test is the Western
Blot Test. See generally Message, supra note 4.
165. White Paper, supra note 140, at 407; M. HODGSON & E. McDoNoUGH, supra
note 140, at 396.
166. White Paper, supra note 140, at 407. A hemophilia patient is cited as an
example. Since blood donations are presently screened, if the patient does not have
AIDS presently, the chance of acquiring the disease is remote. Consequently, the pa-
tient's insurance premiums would reflect this. Id.
167. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.90 (West 1986).
168. Id. A programming and planning analyst with the state insurance commis-
sioner's office has predicted that the insurance commissioner will approve the HTLV-
III test after a recent draft report by a state epidemiologist that the HTLV-III test is
reliable. This approval of the test could occur by the end of 1986. The Milwaukee J.,
July 28, 1986, at 3D, col. I.
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The fact that the legislature altered the statute to provide
for the use of these tests if their accuracy is established might
evidence the legislative intent. 16 9 The statute does not say that
an insurer cannot discriminate against someone who has been
exposed to AIDS or is a member of a high risk group. It says
insurers cannot discriminate based on these test results unless
the accuracy of the tests is verified. This would seem to indi-
cate a concern for the accuracy of the tests, not a concern with
discriminating against high risk individuals. If this is the case,
perhaps the law is justified. Otherwise, the purpose of the
statute would appear to deny the insurer the best, most accu-
rate means available to assess the risks. 170
The failure to allow an insurer to determine the risks does
not only go against the principles of insurance, but also
against the existing laws of Wisconsin. When interpreting
Wisconsin's law against unfair discrimination in charging in-
surance rates, a past Wisconsin Attorney General wrote that
"[t]o charge persons of unequal expectation of life the same
premium would be a palpable discrimination."' 71
Clearly, this is the case with someone who has been ex-
posed to the virus and someone who has not and is not a high
risk group member. To prohibit discrimination against the
latter, this Attorney General's opinion would seem to require
the assessment of a higher premium against the former.
To determine at what rate these standards should be set,
any reasonable method is permissible with only a few excep-
tions.172 The exceptions, noticeably, do not contain sex, sex-
ual orientation or past medical tests. Consideration of the
rating method statute also reveals factors at which insurance
companies may look to determine rates.' 73 Consideration of
the past and of trends may be utilitzed. As already discussed,
the past has shown the high risk that seropositive individuals
169. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15 (West 1986).
170. White Paper, supra note 140, at 403-04.
171. 1910 Op. Att'y Gen. 433 (Wis. Dec. 14, 1908) (discussion of the difference in
the rate charged to a 16 year old man and to a 20 year old man).
172. See Wis. STAT. § 625.12(2) (1983-84). The statute states that "[r]isks may be
classified in any reasonable way for the establishment of rates and minimum premiums,
except that no classifications may be based on race, color, creed or national origin." Id.
173. Id.; see also Wis. STAT. § 628.34 (1983-84).
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pose, and the present trend is that this number is doubling
each year.174
D. Alternatives Available to the Insurance Industry
If insurance companies are not presently permitted to util-
ize these tests in screening applicants, they may have to later
rely on defenses to claims made by AIDS victims. One of the
more obvious would be that the claimant misrepresented or
failed to disclose a material fact. 175 Since the present statute
would not allow the insurance companies to consider antibody
test results for any aspect of insurance coverage, the duty to
inform the company of the test results would not exist. This
defense would therefore not be available. The only material
misrepresentation that could occur is if the patient were al-
ready at the ARC or AIDS stage and was trying to obscure
the symptoms of the disease from doctors in a medical exam.
The second alternative of the insurance company would be
to rely on an exclusion clause. 176 This clause could exempt
preexisting diseases or exempt from coverage liability from
AIDS for a number of years after coverage commences.
There are a number of problems in doing this. Due to the
long incubation period, 177 it would be nearly impossible to de-
termine if the disease existed at the time coverage commenced.
This problem would be especially pronounced if testing were
prohibited. At least, by using the tests, one could say for cer-
tain they did not have the disease prior to a certain date.
The second problem involves determining when the dis-
ease, as a condition, comes into existence. It is not yet known
whether the virus is present and active when the antibody test
174. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
175. Wis. STAT. § 631.11 (1983-84); Nolden v. Mutual Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 80
Wis. 2d 353, 259 N.W.2d 75 (1977); Kelly v. Madison Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 2d
152, 154 N.W.2d 334 (1967).
176. See, e.g., Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 259 N.W.2d 70
(1977). Exclusion clauses are generally valid. 10 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW § 41:378, at 444 (rev. ed. 1982).
177. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. Medical experts have not yet
determined precisely how long the virus incubates. It seems to vary with the individual.
AIDS in the Workplace, supra note 17, at 682-83, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 50-
51 (1986).
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is positive.1 78 Even if the test prior to insurance coverage was
positive, it does not mean the person has the disease. The per-
son is not really considered to have ARC or AIDS until the
symptoms start to manifest themselves. This would probably
not occur until after coverage has commenced. Arguably,
even a positive test prior to insurance coverage does not fulfill
the burden the insurance company bears of proving the condi-
tion existed prior to commencement of insurance coverage.1 79
Third, due to the various diseases that attack an AIDS vic-
tim, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether a
claim is made by a non-AIDS victim with a simple infection,
or whether the claim is being made by someone who acquired
the infection due to their weakened immune system. 180 Tests
would have to be done to nearly every patient submitting a
claim to see if they had AIDS or just a simple infection. In-
surance companies bear the burden of proof with any exclu-
sion.18 1  Without these tests, this difficult task may be
impossible.
The only solution for insurance companies seems to be a
blanket exclusion for AIDS. l8 ' This would end many of the
difficulties associated with screening policyholders. This, of
course, would result in AIDS victims not having insurance
coverage when they need it the most. As with the disease,
there are no easy answers.
178. Clinician's Guide, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in AIDS AND THE LAW 36
(1986).
179. See Nolden, 80 Wis. 2d 353, 259 N.W.2d 75.
180. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. The non-AIDS victim might
suffer from one of the diseases associated with AIDS such as hepatitis but not actually
have AIDS. How the insurance company distinguishes an AIDS victim with hepatitis
from a non-AIDS victim is where the problem arises. This is especially true if the
insurance company is unable to use an antibody screening test.
181. See La Porte Motor Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 397, 245 N.W. 105
(1932); Milonczyk v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 200 Wis. 255, 227 N.W. 873 (1929).
182. A total exclusion for AIDS would also avoid a problem posed by Wis. STAT.
§ 632.76(2) (1983-84). This statute prohibits insurance companies from reducing or de-
nying coverage for a preexisting condition if the policy has been in effect for at least two
years. WIs. STAT. § 632.76(2)(a) (1983-84).
[Vol. 70:55
RIGHTS OF AN AIDS VICTIM IN WISCONSIN
VI. CONCLUSION
AIDS poses a threat not only to an individual's health but
also to his legal rights. The law must adapt and be interpreted
to insure that justice is done for all parties concerned.
In the area of torts this means compensating the injured
party. Traditional tort causes of action that have recently
been applied in other jurisdictions in analogous situations sup-
port this contention.1 83 When these cases and Klegel are
viewed together, it is clear that the balance of rights in Wis-
consin should weigh heavily in favor of a victim's right to
recover.
The solutions are not so apparent when dealing with
AIDS in the workplace. The rights and needs of an AIDS
victim must be considered in light of safety concerns and the
victim's ability to do the job.184 Further complicating this is-
sue is the Wisconsin Supreme Court's determination of what
constitutes a disability. The court should rectify its decision
in American Motors and carry out the legislative intent of the
FEA.1 85 Being classified as disabled would afford to AIDS
victims the essential rights needed to contribute to and exist in
society.
One area where a special exception should not be made is
in procuring insurance. AIDS is by its nature a disease. The
nature of insurance is a voluntary agreement to accept a
risk.186 The nature of the two should be recognized and re-
main intact. There are other solutions to the problem of pay-
ing for AIDS that are more just and do not result in one
segment of society effectively being forced to bear an unfair
burden. The legislature should realize this and the scientific
accuracy of the new antibody screening tests by allowing in-
surers to implement these tests in assessing risks.
BRIAN R. SMIGELSKI
183. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 113, 119-36 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. The legislature expressly calls
for a broad and liberal interpretation of what constitutes a handicap. Wis. STAT.
§ 111.31(3) (1983-84). The court's decision in American Motors Corp. v. Labor & In-
dus. Review Comm'n, 119 Wis. 2d 706, 350 N.W.2d 120 (1984) was clearly a restricted
and strained interpretation of this statute.
186. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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